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North Korean hackers funneled $1.65 billion in stolen cryptocurrency toward weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile programs between January and September, with $1.4 billion stolen from the exchange Bybit in a single February attack, according to a United Nations sanctions monitoring report released this week.
The findings underscore how state-sponsored crypto theft has become Pyongyang’s primary mechanism for circumventing international sanctions and financing its nuclear weapons program.
The report shows that the regime’s strategy employs stablecoins and cyber-operations to further its military ambitions. North Korea crypto operations include the use of stablecoins to procure materials like copper, which is essential for weapon production. The MSMT notes that:
“The country utilises stablecoins for transactions involving military equipment and raw materials, such as copper.”
Additionally, North Korea crypto operations are bolstered by an overseas workforce. IT professionals are deployed in at least eight countries — including China, Russia and Laos — where they contribute to laundering funds and generating revenue for Pyongyang. The MSMT found that “Russia hosts the highest number of North Korean IT workers … contributing to laundering funds and supporting North Korea’s military programmes.”
These activities reflect how North Korea crypto operations have evolved from simple theft to sophisticated networks involving global labour, digital assets and sanctioned-goods procurement.
North Korea crypto operations are intertwined with the regime’s geopolitical manoeuvres. In return for its military contributions to Russia’s conflict in Ukraine, Pyongyang has reportedly deepened its ties with Moscow — a relationship strengthened by mutual sanction exposure.
Further, cyber-recruitment is part of the broader scheme supporting North Korea crypto operations. Agents employed LinkedIn and other platforms to approach South Korean professionals in defence firms under recruitment pretences, seeking access to sensitive technologies. This underscores how North Korea crypto operations go beyond money-laundering to industrial espionage and weapons-adjacent procurement.
A separate analysis by the Stimson Center’s 38 North programme identified cases where North Korean animators, part of the overseas workforce, worked for major streaming platforms while concealing their nationality. The MSMT concluded that such disguised labour forms a part of how North Korea crypto operations sustain themselves financially and technologically.
The scale and sophistication of these operations mean that North Korea crypto operations pose a growing threat to international security frameworks and digital-asset regulation. The MSMT, which began monitoring sanctions violations in October 2024, emphasises that “North Korea’s methods of laundering funds and bypassing sanctions have become more sophisticated over the years.” This evolution raises severe enforcement challenges for governments and regulators worldwide.
For policymakers and digital-asset stakeholders, the revelations about North Korea crypto operations highlight the urgent need for closer coordination across exchanges, fintech firms and enforcement agencies. The interplay between stolen cryptocurrencies, labour abroad, material procurement and geopolitical financing demonstrates that standard regulatory approaches may be inadequate to address the multifaceted nature of North Korea crypto operations.
In light of this, international cooperation on sanction-compliance, crypto-exchange transparency and oversight of stablecoin flows will be key to limiting the impact of North Korea crypto operations. Without robust responses, the mechanism that underpins North Korea’s weapons development may continue to be fuelled by untraceable digital funds.
